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Chapter 4
Factors Affecting Participation
Rates and Contribution Levels
in 401 (kJ Plans
Robert L. Clark and Sylvester J. Schieber
In recent years there has been a growing dependence on section 401 (k)
plans that require voluntary employee contributions as a primary source
of retirement plan funding. Table I shows the growth in the role of
401 (k) plans in the private, employer-sponsored retirement system be-
tween 1984 and 1992. In 1984,2.9 percent of all private plans and 4.0
percent ofall private defined contribution plans had a 401 (k) feature. By
1992, 19.7 percent of all plans and 22.5 percent of the defined contribu-
tion plans included a 401 (k) feature. In 1984, 12.4 percent of all plan
participants and 24.6 percent of all defined contribution participants
were in a 401 (k) plan. By 1992 this had grown to 34.9 and 57.6 percent
respectively. Over the period, the percentage of assets in 401(k) plans
grew from 8.8 to 26.4 percent of all plan assets and from 35.7 to 45.8 of
defined contribution plan assets. Contributions to 401 (k) plans grew
from 18.0 to 50.0 percent of all contributions to private plans and from
37.5 to 68.7 percent of contributions to private defined contribution
plans.
By most measures, it appears that 401 (k) plans are becoming the pre-
dominant form of retirement saving through employer-sponsored plans
as we come to the close of the twentieth century. This development has
not met with universal endorsement. Some critics of401 (k) plans suggest
that "do-it-yourself" retirement plans leave many with inadequate retire-
ment accumulations. They argue that workers may start to save too late in
life and end up accumulating less than they need for retirement; they
may select overly conservative investment options that provide inade-
quate returns; or they may simply save too little over their working lives.
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TABLE I Relative Sizes of 401 (k) Plans in Comparison to All Private Ta.x-Qualified
Plans and All Private Defined Contribution Plans for Selected Years (%)
Plans Participants Assets l-ontributions
All DC All DC All DC All DC
Year plans plans plans plans plans plans plans plans
1984 2.9 4.0 12.4 24.6 8.8 35.7 18.0 37.5
1985 4.7 6.5 16.6 31.1 11.5 36.9 25.6 45.7
1986 5.2 6.9 18.3 33.4 13.2 39.6 31.9 50.1
1987 6.1 7.9 20.7 37.6 15.4 40.9 36.0 53.3
1988 9.3 11.7 24.5 44.6 18.4 41.3 43.2 60.7
1989 11.4 13.9 28.3 51.0 21.3 41.8 47.1 63.0
1990 13.7 16.3 31.6 55.1 23.0 41.7 49.6 64.7
1991 15.9 18.6 31.1 53.5 22.7 42.5 46.4 63.6
1992 19.7 22.5 34.9 57.6 26.4 45.8 50.0 68.7
Source: USDOL (1996).
In addition, critics claim that the accessibility to 401 (k) savings prior to
retirement means that many workers will end up at retirement with little
or nothing left in their old-age nest egg (Ferguson and Blackwell, 1995).
Others argue that people fail to participate in 401 (k) plans because they
do not appreciate their economic vulnerabilities or the favorable saving
opportunities that voluntary retirement plans offer them (Bernheim,
1994, 1995). While mandating contributions and locking them into
401 (k) plans might be perceived asa good way to enhance the retirement
security of current workers, one estimate suggests that a mandatory 3
percent contribution rate would only raise aggregate pension benefits for
workers participating in employer programs less than 2 percent (Sam-
wick and Skinner, 1997).
The growing reliance on voluntary contributory retirement plans in-
creases the importance of participation in these plans. In this study, we
examine the factors associated with variations in participation rates and
workers' contribution levels in a number of 401 (k) plans based on per-
sonal data records of workers eligible to participate in these plans. The
analysis is restricted to i set of employers that offer 401 (k) plans. In that
regard, it does not consider the potential biases in saving behavior of
workers who seek out and tend to stay with employers offering such plans
(Ippolito, 1993). We provide a brief review of other studies that have
evaluated participation in 401 (k) plans. Next, we describe the data set
used for the analysis and summarize the general nature of the plans
offered and the participation in them, followed by statistical analyses of
participation in and contribution rates to the plans under study.
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Previous Research
Relatively few empirical studies have examined the probability that indi-
vidual workers will contribute to a 401 (k) plan and each of these studies
has important data limitations. Here we briefly review five articles that
have examined 401 (k) participation rates and/ or the annual contribu-
tion into these plans, and draw some preliminary findings and identify
major shortcomings in the data employed in these earlier studies. De-
tailed analysis of 401 (k) contributions requires information on individ-
ual workers and plan characteristics. These data need to be from a set of
representative firms in order to capture variation in match rates and
other plan parameters. To date, no study has had access to data of this
quality. Thus, one must be cautious in interpreting the results from prior
studies concerning the participation in 401 (k) plans.
Andrews (1992) presents data showing the growth of 401 (k) coverage
during the 1980s using the Form 5500 data. Her analysis included firms
where the 401 (k) plan was either the primary or secondary pension plan.
Andrews then used the May 1988 Current Population Survey (CPS) to
examine the determinants of participation in 401 (k) plans. She esti-
mated the probability that a worker would be participating in a 401 (k)
plan and found that the likelihood of being in a plan rose with increases
in age, earnings, family income, and tenure. In addition, Andrews es-
timated that employer contributions increased the probability that a
worker would participate in the 401 (k) plan but that individuals with
other pension coverage were less likely to participate. An important lim-
itation to the CPS data is the lack of data on plan characteristics such as
the employer match rate.
Andrews also estimated the amount of annual contributions condi-
tional on 401 (k) participation. Key findings were that older persons had
higher contribution rates, as did workers with larger family income; how-
ever, increases in annual earnings did not raise 401 (k) contribution rates.
Individuals enrolled in plans with employer matches tended to contrib-
ute less to the 401 (k) plans.
The Employee Benefit Research Institute study (EBRI 1994) compares
information from the CPS from May 1988 with April 1993. Between these
surveys, the proportion of workers employed by firms offering 401 (k)
plans increased from 26.9 percent to 36.8 percent. During this period,
the participation rate for all workers increased from 15.3 to 23.8 percent.
The fraction of those eligible to participate in a 401 (k) plan rose from
57.0 to 64.6 percent. The report presents sponsorship and participation
rates by age, earnings, sex, and hours worked. Comparisons indicated
that the participation rate in plans with an employer match was slightly
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higher (78 percent) than participation rate in plans without an employer
match (72 percent).
Further cross-tabulations indicate a nonlinear age relationship, with
participation rates rising with age until around 50 and then declining.
In addition, the participation rate is shown to increase with higher lev-
els of annual earnings. EBRI also reports a nonlinear relationship be-
tween earnings and the proportion of salary contributed to the 401 (k)
plan with the annual contribution rate rising with earnings up to $20,000
and then declining before increasing again for persons with earnings
in excess of $30,000. The contribution rate is lower for participants in
plans with employer matches compared to plans without an employer
contribution.
Papke (1995) uses Form 5500 data for 1986 and 1987 to estimate
participation and contribution rates. A significant shortcoming of this
analysis is the lack of marginal employer match rates. Papke calculates an
average match rate using aggregate employer and employee contribu-
tion rates for each plan. The participation ratio for each plan is deter-
mined by the ratio ofactive plan participants to the number ofemployees
eligible to participate. Participants include all persons with positive ac-
count balances. She then estimates a plan participation rate using plan
average data as a function of firm size, the presence of another pension,
and a series ofdichotomous variables indicating the level of the employer
match. Thus, this study is unable to capture the effects of any worker
characteristics such as age and earnings.
Papke's primary finding is that increases in the match rate are associ-
ated with increases in the plan participation rate; however, these mar-
ginal effects are rather small. For example, a 20 percent employer match
increases the plan participation rate compared to a plan with no em-
ployer contributions by 6.6 percentage points and a 50 percent match
raises the participation by 10.2 percentage points compared to a plan
with no employer match. A dollar for dollar match increases the par-
ticipation rate by 17.4 percentage points over a zero match. In addition,
she finds that the participation rate rises slightly (1.2 percentage points)
when the company does not have another pension plan and that in-
creases in firm size decrease participation in the 401 (k) plan. There is no
change in the participation model between 1986 and 1987.
Papke estimates a fixed effects model to control for unobservable fac-
tors that are affecting the participation rate such as the fact that some
firms attract workers who are more likely to be savers. The estimated
effects for the match rates in the fixed effects model are much smaller
and are statistically insignificant. Papke concludes "that match rates do
not affect the level of participation once plan unobservables are con-
trolled for." She speculates that the efforts of benefit staff and the quality
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of their communications may be one of the unobservables affecting par-
ticipation rates.
Papke also examines annual employee contributions using the same
model. She finds that contributions are higher in plans with employer
matches up to 80 percent compared to a plan with no match; however,
the marginal effect of increasing the match rate above 10 percent are
small, generally insignificant, and often negative. Plans with matches in
excess of 80 percent have lower employee contributions compared to
plans without any employer match.
Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (this volume) estimate employee contribu-
tions to a 401 (k) plan sponsored by a single medium-sized manufactur-
ing firm between 1988 and 1991. The employer match rates varied sub-
stantially during this period from 25 percent of the first 6 percent of
eligible compensation in one year to over 100 percent in another before
the match was entirely eliminated in the final year. The data represent
information on 12,000 salaried and nonunion hourly employees. Annual
participation rates varied from 78 to 84 percent with only those actually
making contributions in a given year being counted as participants.
The large changes in the match rate from one year to the next resulted
in only small changes in the annual participation rate while changes in
the match rate had a small but noticeable effect on the contribution rates
of participants. The authors report large bunching of participants at the
maximum plan contribution limit of 10 percent of compensation, the
maximum employee contributions that receive an employer match (6
percent of compensation), and the IRS contribution limits of $7,000.
They report that three-quarters ofall employees are at one of the kinks or
constraints and that participants rarely change their contribution levels
to reflect changes in the plan structure.
Bernheim and Garrett (1995) evaluate the effects of employer-based
education programs on participation in retirement plans. This analysis is
based on a survey of household finances done during the fall of 1994.
The survey covered a nationally representative sample of people between
the ages of 30 and 48. It gathered standard economic and demographic
data on the respondents plus levels of knowledge on financial matters,
sources of information on such matters, and information on financial
education or information provided in the workplace. The data used in
the analysis did not include information on matching ofworker contribu-
tions to 401 (k) or similar plans covering workers. The authors developed
two measures of educational information for the participants in the sur-
vey. The first was a binary variable indicating whether the employer of-
fered informative materials and programs to assist in retirement plan-
ning. The second was a binary variable indicating whether the employee
used such materials.
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Burnheim and Garrett estimated that participation rates were 19.5
percentage points higher for workers who used educational materials
than for those who did not receive or use such materials. They found that
participation was lower for workers eligible for another pension plan,
higher for workers with higher wages, and not significantly different on
the basis of worker's age or education. The authors also estimated that
the effects ofeducation were large and highly significant on contribution
levels to the plans. Finally, they found that there were spillover effects
from communications programs positively affecting workers' spouses'
participation in their own 401 (k) plans, but found the effect on spouses'
accumulated balances to be insignifican t.
Although research examining participation in and contributions to
401 (k) plans is very limited, several consistent findings have emerged.
These previous studies suggest that the probability of participation is a
positive but nonlinear function of age and annual earnings, that higher
employer match rates raise the likelihood of participation, that the pres-
ence of other company pensions reduces the proportion of workers par-
ticipating in 401 (k) plans, and that a lower percentage ofworkers in large
firms opt to participate in 401 (k) plans. Annual contributions as a per-
cent of salary rise with age of the worker while higher employee matching
rates seem to reduce annual contributions. These findings suggest an
empirical model for estimating the determinants of 401 (k) participation
and contributions. Each of these hypotheses will be tested using a rela-
tively large number of workers employed during 1994 in a number of
firms from which we could get administrative record data.
New Empirical Evidence
The data used in the present analysis were collected by Watson Wyatt
from employer administrative records at the end of 1994. The 401 (k)
plans included in the data set represent 19 firms ranging in size from 700
to 10,000 employees from a variety of industries, have a wide range of
match rates, and include some firms with relatively generous defined
benefit plans in addition to the 401 (k) plan as well as firms whose only
retirement plan is the 401 (k) plan. These 19 firms were not randomly
selected, but were rather a set of firms where we could accumulate the
necessary data to develop the analysis. While these firms are not statis-
tically representative of the universe of firms sponsoring 401 (k) plans, we
have no reason to believe that the firms, their 401 (k) plan, or the workers
eligible to participate in them have characteristics that would specifically
bias our results.
The analysis of participation in a range of 401 (k) plans presented
below allows us to explore some of the hypotheses elaborated above in
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somewhat more detail. We have the benefit of having administrative rec-
ords on employee wage levels, contribution and match rates, and other
variables that workers sometimes have difficulty recalling in survey set-
tings. We can also control for the existence of a defined benefit plan, and
further can estimate the overall generosity of such plans. Like many
other studies in this area, we lack information on the nonpension assets
owned by workers covered under the plans being studied or by other
persons in their immediate families.
The general characteristics of the plans are summarized in Table 2,
which describes plan incentives that might influence participation rates
and contribution levels and shows 401 (k) coverage and participation
rates in each of the plans studied. The second column of the table shows
the employer matching pattern in the various plans. All of the plans
included in this study match some level ofemployee contributions. While
the majority of plans have a constant matching rate, there are a number
that have variable rates. Plans 0, Q, and R are somewhat different than
normal in that they provide for some matching, but limit it in a relatively
unique fashion. Plan 0 restricts matching to workers with pay levels
below $50,000 and matches contributions on up to 4 percent of the first
$30,000 of pay. Plan Q matches only 25 percent of the first $400 per year
that the worker contributes to the plan but contributes $0.12 for each
hour worked under the plan. Plan R matches 25 percent of contributions
up to the first $3,000 per year contributed to the plan without regard to
pay level. The third column in the table shows the maximum percentage
of pay on which contributions are matched by the plan sponsor. For all
but three of the plans, the sponsor matches contributions on amounts up
to 2 to 6 percent of pay, with the modal rate being 6 percent.
The fourth column in the table shows the relative generosity of the
defined benefit plan offered by the sponsor of the 401 (k) plan under
study. This measure was derived by calculating a projected defined bene-
fit pension at age 65 and the potential replacement of projected earnings
for the year prior to retirement under that plan for workers eligible to
participate in that firm's 401(k) plan. Job tenure and age was used to
project each worker's ultimate years of coverage under the defined bene-
fit plan, assuming the worker stayed until age 65. Covered pay under the
plan was projected by incrementing current pay by 5 percent per year
from 1994 until the year the worker would attain age 65. The average
defined benefit level presented in the table is stated as a percent of final
salary for the average worker.
The reason for including the generosity of the defined benefit plan in
the analysis relates to the nature of the employer-sponsored retirement
plans as target savings vehicles that allow workers to accumulate sufficient
wealth to maintain preretirement standards of living after they retire. If
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TABLE 2 Matching Provisions of 401 (k) Plans, Generosity of Defined Benefit
Plans, Workers Covered in the 401 (k) Plans, and Participation Rates for
Individual Plans
Maximum Average
Employer percent defined benefit
matching rates ofpay replacement Number of Participation
Plan and patterns matched rate at 65 employees rate
A 50% 6% 33.4 1,853 78.7
B 100% of2% of 4% 45.6 1,627 62.8
pay, 75% of next
1% of pay, 50%
of next 1%
of pay
C 100% 3% 27.8 3,458 76.84
D 50% 6% 18.9 1,422 91.8
E 25% 6% 21.5 864 81.9
F 60% 4% 26.1 1,372 93.1
G 25% 4% 0.0 1,660 90.7
H 100% o£1% of 4% 25.9 5,746 97.7
pay, 25% of next
3% of pay
I 100% 3% 20.7 9,637 61.5
J 25% 6% 27.9 1,342 65.4
K 100% 3% 41.1 9,598 88.9
L 50% 2% 0.0 2,388 53.2
M 50% 6% 32.2 1,891 98.8
N 50% 6% 38.7 10,585 47.4
0 25% for workers 4% 22.4 2,035 58.7
with pay up to
$50,000 on pay
up to $30,000
per year
P 75% 6% * 774 91.5Q $0.12 per hour, * 750 56.8
25% up to first
$400 or
employee
contributions
R 25% on first 0.0 966 71.2
$3,000 of
employee
contributions
S 100% 6% • 2,951 91.4
Source: Authors" computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
'Signifies company had no defined benefit plan.
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TABLE 3 Average Contributions to 401 (k) Plans by Age ofWorker for Workers
Aged 21 to 64 with Annual Wages $5,000 or Above and One or More
Years Tenure
Contribution Average amtribution by age ofparticipant ($)
quintile 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ All ages ($)
1st 20% 177 348 427 458 379 338
2nd 20% 440 816 1,049 1,136 955 825
3rd20% 708 1,348 1,777 1,970 1,717 1,436
4th 20% 1,137 2,178 2,844 3,378 3,061 2,418
5th 20% 2,609 4,918 6,178 6,983 6,542 5,592
Total participan ts 6,081 16,254 13.809 7,338 1,263 44,745
Mean contribution 1,014 1,921 2,455 2,785 2,533 2,122
No. at limit' 1 94 255 206 33 589
% at limit 0.02 0.58 1.85 2.81 2.61 1.32
Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyau Worldwide data.
*In 1994, federal tax law limited a worker's pretax contributions to a 401 (k) plan to $9,240
of earnings.
employer-sponsored retirement plans do work as target savings vehicles,
the more generous a worker's defined benefit plan, the less he or she
would have to save under the 401 (k) plan to accumulate sufficient wealth
to meet the retirement savings target.
The last two columns in Table 2 show the number ofemployees eligible
to participate in each of the 401 (k) plans under study, and the plan's
participation rate during 1994. In order to be considered a plan partici-
pant, a worker had to have contributed to the plan during 1994. Par-
ticipation rates ranged from a low 47.4 percent to a high of 98.8 percent;
the overall participation rate across the whole set of plans during 1994
was 73.5 percent.
Average contribution rates by plan participants distributed by age ap-
pear in Table 3. The table excludes nonparticipants. The number of par-
ticipants shown at the bottom of the table as being at their maximum
dollar contribution limit imposed by the IRS reflects the number in each
age group that contributed the statutory maximum of $9,240 to their
401 (k) during 1994. We find it surprising that so relatively few workers
contributed at this level- fewer than 3 percent even for the older age
groups. Generally, contribution levels confirm our expectations that
older workers would contribute at higher levels than younger ones. The
one exception is that average contributions at each quintile level for
workers over age 60 are lower than for workers in their fifties at the same
quintile level. Workers age 60 and over have somewhat lower wage levels
than workers aged 50 to 59. As a result the lower dollar contributions ac-
tually represent higher contribution rate, as we show later (see Table 6).
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TABLE 4 Average Contributions to 401 (k) Plans by Workers Aged 21 to 64 with
Annual Wages $5,000 or Above and One or More Years Tenure
Average contribution by annual salary oj
Contribution participant (thousands oJ$) AU salary
quintile 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100+ levels ($)
1st 20% 172 544 1,200 1,922 2,865 338
2nd 20% 404 1,103 2,001 3,007 5,200 825
3rd 20% 635 1,621 2,843 4,251 7,521 1,436
4th 20% 949 2,410 4,311 6,377 9,078 2,418
5th 20% 1,832 4,811 7,520 8,738 9,240 5,592
Total participants 14,680 19,832 7,683 1,641 909 44,745
Mean contribution 798 2,098 3,575 4,861 6,785 2,122
No. at limit 0 0 217 117 255 589
% at limit 0.0 0.0 2.8 7.1 28.1 1.3
Source: Authors' compulaLions using Watson Wyatt Worldwide dat.a.
TABLE 5 Participation Rates in 401 (k) Plans by Workers' Ages for Workers Aged
21 to 64 with Annual Wages $5,000 or Above and One or More Years
Tenure
Plan
Participation rate by age ofworkersparticipation
Plan rate 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
A 78.7 60.8 77.9 85.1 85.1 87.5
B 62.8 40.0 57.7 63.9 75.5 73.4
C 76.8 75.9 83.9 75.3 70.7 70.4
D 91.6 81.9 91.3 94.7 98.3 89.9
E 81.9 47.3 83.5 84.4 86.8 81.8
F 93.1 83.0 92.8 94.4 95.1 91.7
G 90.7 86.6 91.8 91.7 91.0 85.4
H 97.7 98.4 97.9 97.1 97.5 96.8
I 61.5 49.7 70.4 68.8 75.3 83.0
J 65.4 55.8 60.7 69.0 73.0 80.9
K 88.9 72.5 88.0 89.5 92.9 91.2
L 53.2 40.0 56.8 59.3 52.7 46.2
M 98.8 98.4 99.2 97.8 99.4 100.0
47.4 36.6 43.7 49.2 58.6 61.4
a 58.7 50.5 58.3 62.9 58.5 53.5
P 91.5 85.7 90.8 90.1 93.2 100.0
Q 56.8 51.3 53.0 59.1 62.7 64.3
R 7\.2 52.1 72.3 76.5 76.1 88.9
S 91.4 75.2 90.1 94.0 96.4 97.7
All plans 73.5 62.3 73.4 75.1 81.1 80.5
Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
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TABLE 6 Average Contribution to 401 (k) Plans as a Percentage of Pay by Age of
Workers Aged 21 to 64 with Annual Wages $5.000 or Above and One or
More Years Tenure
Average Average
Average % ofpay contributed by age ofwlYl"kerscontribution contribution
Plan amount rate 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
A $2,121 5.7 4.3 5.4 5.8 7.0 6.9
B 1,456 4.3 2.6 3.4 4.1 5.2 6.6
C 2,771 8.1 6.9 8.0 7.8 8.7 9.8
D 1,613 6.1 4.9 5.8 6.1 7.3 7.5
E 3,114 6.4 4.6 5.5 6.5 8.4 8.2
F 3,029 5.8 4.1 5.2 5.9 6.8 6.2
G 2,034 5.3 4.4 5.0 5.8 6.4 7.8
H 1,177 4.7 3.8 4.4 4.9 6.1 6.8
I 880 3.5 3.0 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.6
J 3,271 6.3 5.4 5.9 6.3 7.4 7.2
K 3,470 6.9 6.0 6.4 6.7 8.2 8.7
L 1,229 3.7 3.2 3.7 3.9 3.8 4.2
M 2,091 7.2 6.2 6.7 7.4 8.5 9.3
N 1,498 2.9 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.3
0 924 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.6 3.3 4.3
P 1,668 6.4 6.0 6.0 6.1 7.2 7.6
Q 1,079 4.9 3.4 4.5 4.3 6.4 8.2
R 4,379 6.8 5.9 6.6 7.0 9.1 7.9
S 3,236 6.3 5.0 5.9 6.5 7.1 7.3
All plans 2,122 5.3 4.0 5.0 5.4 6.7 7.1
Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
The quintile distribution of contributions by 401 (k) particIpants on
the basis of salary level during 1994 appears in Table 4. In this case the
distributions show a consistent pattern of increasing at each successively
higher salary level. For workers whose annual pay fell below $50,000 in
1994, none were at the 401 (k) contribution limit for the year. Even
among those whose annual salaries were $100,000 or more for the year,
only 28 percent contributed at the maximum dollar rate. It is possible
that many workers at this level are constrained by the actual deferral
percentage (ADP) limits in their plans. These ADP limits, set by law, often
constrain contributions for highly compensated employees (HCEs) well
below the dollar maximums established by law. In at least one case, we
know the plan sponsor has established a nonqualified plan that sub-
stitutes for participation in the 401 (k) plan for employees whose pay
exceeds $100,000 per year.
Participation rates in the individual plans by the age of covered worker
are presented in Table 5. In general, participation rates rise with a
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TABU: 7 Participation Rates in 401 (k) Plans by Workers' Salary Levels for
Workers Aged 21 to 64 with Annual Wages $5,000 or Above and One or
More Years Tenure
Plan Participation rate by workers' annual salary level
participation (in thousands oJ$)
Plan rate 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100+
A 78.7 62.4 89.2 93.1 97.4 97.4
B 62.8 48.1 78.2 85.2 92.3 100.0
C 76.8 63.7 84.8 89.0 94.0 60.0
0 91.6 88.8 97.7 100.0 100.0 93.8
E 81.9 50.0 83.6 91.3 93.5 89.5
F 93.1 91.3 92.7 93.8 100.0 96.8
G 90.7 88.3 90.4 96.2 100.0 100.0
H 97.7 98.0 97.0 98.8 100.0 100.0
I 61.5 56.0 83.8 94.9 49.4 6.8
J 65.4 30.3 70.3 79.8 90.5 91.8
K 88.9 69.1 86.4 94.0 97.3 97.5
L 53.2 36.8 76.7 87.7 84.9 100.0
M 98.8 98.2 99.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 47.4 33.6 38.4 67.4 82.5 88.4
0 58.7 45.7 66.4 62.2 55.6 61.5
P 91.5 90.5 92.6 NA NA NA
Q 56.8 55.7 59.4 NA NA NA
R 71.2 34.5 60.9 80.7 78.0 83.3
S 91.4 80.5 90.7 94.4 94.2 96.7
All plans 73.5 66.3 74.2 84.9 88.7 80.4
Source: Authors' computations using "'atson Wyatt Worldwide data.
worker's age. On average, workers in their fifties and sixties have par-
ticipation rates that are about 20 percentage points higher than those in
their twenties. Participation rises the most as workers move from their
twenties to thirlies, increasing 11.2 percentage points. There is consider-
able variation in participation patterns among the plans, however. In
some cases, high participation rates are achieved even among workers in
their twenties. In Plan C, for example, participation for workers in their
twenties actually exceeds the rates for workers in their fifties and sixties.
Average contribution amounts and rates for participants in each of the
plans are reported in Table 6. Average contributions to the 40I(k) plans
vary from a low of $880 per year to a high of about $4,380 per year. In
virtually every case, there is a steady increase in the average contribution
rate at successively higher ages up through workers in their fifties, and, in
most cases, workers in their sixties participating in a plan contribute at
higher rates than those in their fifties.
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TABU'; 8 Average Contribution to 401 (k) Plans as a Percentage of Pay by Pay Level
for Workers Aged 21 to 64 with Annual Wages $5,000 or Above and One or
More Years Tenure
Average Averag>' Average % ofpay contributed by age ofwurkers'
contribution contribution -<alary levels (in thousand.< of$)
Plan amount rate 0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100+
A $2,120 5.7 5.0 6.1 6.5 4.9 4.6
B 1,456 4.3 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.9
C 2,771 8.1 6.8 8.7 9.3 8.0 5.5
D 1,613 6.1 5.7 6.6 7.1 7.5 5.8
E 3,114 6.4 5.3 6.2 7.0 6.7 6.2
F 3,029 5.8 5.6 6.3 0.0 6.7 5.0
G 2,034 5.3 4.4 5.5 6.6 6.1 6.4
H 1,177 4.7 4.3 .1.3 5.8 3.8 3.7
I 880 3.5 3.3 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.6
J 3,271 6.3 5.7 5.9 6.8 7.3 6.6
K 3,470 6.9 5.2 6.8 7.4 6.7 6.3
L 1,229 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.7 3.6 4.1
M 2,091 7.2 7.4 6.9 7.9 7.9 5.6
N 1,498 2.9 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 2.7
0 925 2.7 2.8 2.6 3.4 2.5 2.8
P 1,068 6.4 6.4 6.5 NA NA NA
Q 1,079 4.9 4.9 4.6 NA NA NA
R 4,379 6.8 6.4 7.6 7.5 6.6 4.4
S 3,236 6.3 6.2 6.6 6.1 6.2 5.7
All plans 2,122 5.3 4.5 5.0 6.0 5.8 5.0
Source: Authors' computations using Watson WYdlt Wurldwide data.
Participation rates by annual pay, provided in Table 7, show that work-
ers at successively higher pay levels generally have higher participation
rates, although the rates in a number of the plans drop at earnings levels
01'$75,000 per year or higher. Undoubtedly the ADP limit considerations
come into play in a number of cases. Plan I, for example, has a non-
qualified benefit for highly compensated workers that reduces participa-
tion by those in the upper end of the wage distribution in the 401 (k)
plan.
Contributions as a fraction of pay appear in Table 8. Though contribu-
tion rates rise with pay levels, this tendency is attenuated for employees
earning over $100,000 during 1994. Here the percent of pay contributed
to the 401 (k) plan was less than for workers at the $50,000 to $75,000
level. Also, in more than half the cases the con tribution rates for workers
earning between $75,000 and $100,000 fell below the contribution raLe
for workers at the $50,000 Lo $75,000 level of earnings.
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A Multivariate Model of Participation in and
Contributions to 401 (kJ Plans
To test the observed relationships between worker and plan characteris-
tics and participation in 401 (k) plans more formally, we estimate (1) the
probability that individual workers participate in a 401 (k) plan and
(2) the size of workers' annual contributions as a percent of annual
earnings, given that a worker chooses to participate in a plan.
Deciding to Participate in a 40 I (k) Plan
We model the probability that an individual worker will participate in a
401 (k) plan as a function of the worker's age, his or her annual earnings,
the value of any other company-provided pension, and other personal
characteristics such as other family wealth, retirement plans, marginal
income tax bracket, etc.! Considerable information suggests that retire-
ment savings increase with age; however, this tends to be a nonlinear
relationship and savings may actually decline as the actual date of retire-
ment approaches. The value of tax deferred savings is greater for persons
with higher earnings and, as a result, high-wage workers will be more
likely to participate in 401 (k) plans. In addition, higher-income workers
may need to save more to attain the level of desired retirement income
due to the progressive nature of the social security benefit formula. Of
course, workers with higher income may have more discretionary income
out of which to save. For these reasons, workers with higher earnings are
expected to be more likely to participate in 401 (k) plans. Ifworkers have
a target for retirement income, the existence of other pension benefits
would be expected to reduce the probability of participation in the
401 (k) plan.
In addition to these worker variables, several employer and plan char-
acteristics are expected to influence the 401 (k) participation decision.
These include the rate at which the company matches the first dollar of
individual contributions, the extent of communications concerning the
401 (k) plan, and the size of the company. Higher match rates are ex-
pected to entice a larger percentage of workers to participate in the
401 (k) plan by increasing the value of each dollar contributed to the
plan. In developing the model of participation and contribution rates, we
had no plans that did not match participant contributions to their 401 (k)
plans at some level. Better communications by the company will improve
the worker's understanding of the program and should lead to increased
participation.
Participation in a 401 (k) plan is estimated using a multivariate logit
model; the results are shown in Table 9.2 The values reported in the table
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TABLE 9 Logit Estimation of 401 (k) Participation Rates
Variable
Estimation with /7 companies
Logit t-value ojthe
estimate parameter*
Estimation with /5 companies
Logit t-value oj the
estimate parameter*
CONSTANT -29.194 -13.19 -28.754 -12.74
AGE 2.071 11.81 2.637 11.27
WAGE 0.657 38.52 0.813 43.21
AGE' -9.690 -11.23 -9.494 -10.77
WAGE2 -4.419 -23.89 -5.350 -26.89
AGE' 15.026 10.71 14.779 10.31
WAGE' 8.796 15.76 10.631 17.67
AGE' -8.492 -10.22 -8.396 -9.89
WAGE' -5.375 -11.62 -6.519 -13.03
REPRATE -0.028 -20.17
MATCH2 0.928 21.08 1.611 29.88
MATCH3 2.143 50.48 2.691 55.47
SIZE -1.917 -67.40 -2.029 -67.36
COM1 0.388 12.25 0.864 20.77
COM2 0.740 21.28 1.204 28.38
Likelihood ratio chi-square 10,924.98 10,678.38
Observations 59,203 55,478
Percent correctly predicted 77.6 77.0
Madalla's pseudo R-square 0.1685 0.1751
McFadden's pseudo R-square 0.1601 0.1637
The regression results presented here are based on 55,000 to 60,000 worker observations,
but the workers are grouped in a relatively sOlaH number of plans. Regression models using
such data can resuh in "group effeCls" that result in a downward bias in the esumalion of
standard errors of estimated coefficients. To investigate the group effects in our model. we
estimated a r.mdom-<:oefficien t logit model (seeJain et a!., 1994). The results of this estima-
tion (available from the authors on request) show that although most t-ratios from the
random-<:oefficient logit model are smaller than those reported here. all the parameter
estimates still have the same signs and all are still statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. The relative magnitudes of the parameter estimates also remain the same as those
reported here. These results lead us to conclude that even though the group effects exist in
our model. the results and related conclusions reported in the paper are still valid. To
simplify our analysis and explanations, the results from the ordinary logit model are all that
are presented here.
approximately represent the change in the probability of participation
due to a one-unit change in the con tinuous explanatory variables such as
age or the change in the dichotomous variables from a value of zero to
one with other explanatory variables held constant at their mean values.s
Levels of significance for the estimated parameters are reported in the
table. (The logit coefficients from which these marginal effects are de-
rived are available from the authors upon request.) The values reported
in the second column are based on employment records from 17 com-
panies while the results in the fourth column include only 15 companies.
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The difference is due to the elimination of two companies for whom
we were unable to calculate replacement rates from other company-
provided pensions. Thus, the results reported in the second column are
from a logit equation that did not include the replacement rate variable
while the results presented in the fourth column are from a similar equa-
tion that does include the replacement rate variable. Since the results are
fairly consistent between the two equations, only the estimates reported
in the fourth column are discussed.
Earlier, we showed that there was not much variation in the match rate
of employee contributions across the plans in this data set. As a result,
match rates were grouped into three categories: 25 percent, 50 to 75
percent, and 100 percent. The estimates in column 4 of Table 9 indicate
that relative to being in a plan with a 25 percent match rate, a worker
covered by a plan with a 50 to 75 percent match rate is 28 percentage
points more likely to participate in the 401 (k) plan. Workers in plans with
a 100 percent match rate are 47 percentage points more likely to make an
annual contribution to the plan than those in a plan with only a 25
percent match rate. These results are statistically significant and imply
that increased match rates increase the participation rate in a 401 (k)
plan. These findings are in general agreement with early studies that
showed employer matches increasing the level of participation; however,
the estimated magnitude of the increases in the probability of participa-
tion associated with higher match rates found here is considerably larger
than that found in earlier studies. 4 Since all the plans in our sample
provided some employer match, we were unable to test the effect ofsome
match versus no employer match on the probability of participation.
The larger estimated effect of increases in the match rate on the proba-
bility of participation in the 401 (k) plan found in this analysis may be
due, in part, to the inclusion of the value of the current coverage in an
employet'-provided defined benefit plan. This variable has been omitted
in previous studies. If the generosity of the defined benefit plan that has a
negative effect on participation is positively correlated with the match
rate on the 401 (k) plan, excluding this variable from the estimation
equation will result in biased estimates of the effect of match rates on the
probability of participation in the 401 (k) plan. Thus, the lower estimates
found in earlier studies may be due to their omission of other company-
provided pension benefits.
Workers are more likely to enroll in plans when they understand and
feel comfortable about the investment opportunities. A key to the par-
ticipation decision is the amount and quality of information provided by
the plan sponsor. We attempt to measure this activity by considering
three levels of plan communications. The first level of communication
consists of only distributing plan enrollment forms and required peri-
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odic statements of account balances. All plans in the sample provided
this level of communication. The second level of employer communica-
tion (COM1) provides workers with generic newsletters related to par-
ticipation in 401 (k) plans. These statements are generally prepared by
consulting firms and investment managers, and they discuss current fi-
nancial market trends, personal investment strategies, and the national
economic environment. The third level of communications (COM2) in-
volves sending workers communication materials specifically tailored to
the individual company's 401 (k) plan. These materials generally give
more detailed information about the specific plans covering the workers
receiving the materials and may even suggest appropriate savings levels in
the 401 (k) plan, given Social Security and other pension coverage of-
fered by the firm.
Companies can provide COM1, COM2, or both types of information to
their employees. Approximately 60 percent of the workers in the Wat-
son Wyatt data are enrolled in plans that provide the generic infor-
mation, and approximately 60 percent are in plans that provide indi-
vidually tailored information. About 20 percent are enrolled in plans
where both types ofcommunication are used. The logit analysis estimates
these two communications strategies as having independent effects on
participation.5
The estimated effects indicate that increasing the quality of communi-
cations significantly increases participation rates. If a company provides
generic materials in addition to the required forms and statements, the
probability of a worker's participating in the 401 (k) plan increases by 15
percentage points. Further use of specifically prepared information tai-
lored for a company's own plan increases the probability of participation
relative to only having the required information by 21 percentage points.
The estimated effects ofcommunication efforts indicate that a firm using
both generic and specifically tailored information can increase participa-
tion rates by 36 percentage points while holding the match rate constant.
This finding suggests that firms with relatively low participation rates
may use increased education to attempt to raise participation rates. Thus,
firms with low past participation rates may be found to have high and
increasing levels of education. While this may suggest that the educa-
tional activities of the firm are made simultaneous with the participation
decisions of its workers, the process is more likely to be recursive. In-
creased education in time t follows low participation in time t - 1. If this
model correctly captures the participation effect on education, educa-
tion in time t is exogenous to the participation decision in time t and our
participation equation is correctly specified. Thus, workers make current
participation decisions based on education programs that were put in
place by the firm at an earlier date.
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Figure 1. Probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan by age under alternative
matching assumptions (COM1 = 1, COM2 = 0, WAGE = $35,000, SIZE = 0, REP-
RATE = 20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide
data.
Increases in the replacement rate (REPRATE) expected from other
employer-provided pension plans significantly reduces the probability of
participation in the 40 I (k) plan, but the estimated effect is very small, as
Table 9 shows. The logit estimates indicate that a 10 percentage point
increase in the replacement rate would decrease the probability of par-
ticipation in the 401 (k) plan by 0.48 percentage points. Workers em-
ployed in smaller firms are more likely to participate in the 401 (k) plan
than are comparable workers in large firms.
Prior research, discussed earlier, suggested that age and wage have
nonlinear effects on the probability of participation in a 401 (k) plan. To
allow for these effects, we include four moments for both age and annual
earnings in the logit equation. The nonlinear relationships between age
and participation and wage and participation can not be easily read from
the parameter estimates shown in Table 9. In order to describe the full
effects of advancing age and increases in annual earnings, we have de-
rived age/wage profiles that are shown in Figures 1 to 6. These profiles
also enable us to better illustrate the relative effects of alternative match
rates and communication strategies on the probability of participation in
the plan. All profiles in the figures are drawn assuming a replacement
rate from other pension plans of 20 percent (REPRATE = 20.0) and the
company is among the smaller firms in our sample (SIZE=O). In the age
profiles, annual earnings are set equal to $35,000, and in the earnings
profiles, age is assumed to be 40. Finally, each figure either holds the
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Figure 2. Probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan by wage under alternative
matching assumptions (COMI =1, COM2 = 0, AGE = 40, SIZE = 0, REPRATE =
20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
communication strategy or the match rate constant while the other is
allowed to vary. With the exception of Figure 5, all figures with a constant
match rate are based on a match rate of25 percent and the figures with a
constant communication strategy assume that the firm provides generic
but not specific plan and investment information.
Figure 1 illustrates how the probability of participation changes with
advancing age for three different match rates. Holding the match rate
constant, the age profiles indicate that the probability of participation
increases fairly rapidly for workers during their twenties and then re-
mains relatively stable from age 30 to age 58. The participation proba-
bility then declines for the oldest workers. For example, the predicted
probability of participation for workers aged 21 in a plan with a match
rate of 25 percent is just below 40 percent. By age 30, the likelihood of
participating in the plan has risen to over 60 percent. The predicted
probability declines with age for older workers, falling back to approx-
imately 50 percent for workers aged 65. Figure 1 also illustrates the im-
pact of increasing the match rate on the probability of participation at
each age. Raising the match rate from 25 percent to 50 to 75 percent
increases the participation probability of workers in their early twenties
from around 40 percent to approximately 70 percent. The effects of
higher match rates is less for older workers.
Figure 2 presents the relationship between the participation proba-
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Figure 3. Probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan by age under alternative
communications programs (MATCH = 25%, WAGE = $35,000, SIZE = 0, REP-
RATE = 20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide
data.
bility and annual earnings. Holding the match rate constant, the likeli-
hood of participating in a 401 (k) plan increases sharply as earnings rise
from $10,000 to $50,000. For a plan with a 25 percent match rate, the
participation probability for a worker with earnings ofless than $20,000 is
around 30 percent. The likelihood of participation increases to 70 per-
cent for workers with earnings of $50,000. The probability of participat-
ing in a plan then remains fairly stable with a slight decline in the likeli-
hood of being in the plan for persons with very high earnings. Once
again, the figure shows how increases in the match rate raise the proba-
bility of participation in the plan.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show similar age and wage relationships holding
constant the match rate while allowing for alternative communication
strategies. In each case, the age and wage profiles are shifted up as
the firm provides more and higher-quality information concerning the
40 I (k) plan. These profiles clearly illustrate the substantial impact that
information programs can have on worker decisions to contribute funds
to a 401 (k) plan.
The significance ofcommunication programs is further highlighted in
Figure 6. This figure shows a wage participation profile while allo\\~ng
both the match rate and the communications strategy to vary. The lowest
profile is based on a match rate of 25 percent and assumes that the
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Figure 4. Probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan by wage under alternative
communications programs (MATCH = 25%, AGE = 40, SIZE = 0, REPRATE =
20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
PartIcIpation I'lItlI
100~itJ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
80
80
-+-Com101Q, Com2-o
__Com1=O, Com2-1
- -Com1-1. Com2-o
_Com1-1, Com2-1
15013011070 90
~nds of dollars
5030
4O+-,........,-r"""'T"....-......-,........,-r"""T""-r-......-,........,-r"""'T"....-......-,........,-r"""'T"""-"""-"""""--"-'
10
Figure 5. Probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan by wage under alternative
communications programs (MATCH = 100%, AGE = 40, SIZE = 0, REPRATE =
20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
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Figure 6. Probability of participating in a 401 (k) plan by wage under alternative
communications and matching programs (AGE = 40, SIZE = 0, REPRATE = 20%).
Source; Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt Worldwide data.
firm only provides the required communications concerning the plan
(COMl=O and COM2=0). Participation probabilities can then be com-
pared for two scenarios: (l) the match rate is increased to 100 per-
cent, holding the communication strategy constant (the top profile) and
(2) both generic and plan-specific information is provided and the match
rate remains at 25 percent (the middle profile). As shown in the figure,
improving communications concerning the plan has nearly as significant
effect on the probability of participation as does increasing the match
rate from 25 to 100 percent.
To illustrate this point, compare the participation probabilities for a
worker earning $30,000 under each of the three assumptions. The proba-
bility that a worker in a plan with a 25 percent match and only required
communications will participate in the 401 (k) plan is slightly over 34
percent. Increasing the match rate to 100 percent without improving
plan communications results in an increase in the probability of par-
ticipation to just over 88 percent. In contrast, if the match rate is held
constant at 25 percent but the firm provides both generic and specific
information, the likelihood that the worker will participate in the plan
increases to slightly more than 80 percent.
This is an extremely important finding. It indicates that firms strug-
gling to meet discrimination rules can increase participation rates by
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doing a better job of informing their workers about the 401 (k) plan and
its investment options. The figure indicates that the magnitude of this
effect is much large for workers with lower annual earnings and, there-
fore, firms providing high-quality plan information will have an easier
time meeting discrimination requirements. In general, this option of
improved communications will be much less expensive to the company
than increasing the match rate.
Annual Contribution Rates
Conditional on participation in a 401 (k) plan, workers must decide on
their annual contribution. Table 10 presents the results ofordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates ofworkers' annual contributions as a percent of
annual earnings for each of the 401 (k) plan participants in all 17 com-
panies, and also separately for the 15 companies with for which we de-
rived defined benefit replacement rates. The two specifications are so
similar that we again focus on the plans with projected defined benefit
replacement rates for workers at age 65. Once again, most of the variables
are statistically significant and the direction of influence is consistent
with the earlier results on participation.
The results show that increasing age and wage levels have a strong
positive and statistically significant effect on workers' contribution rates
under the plans. The generosity oCthe expected benefit fmm the defined
benefit pension plan has a very small negative but statistically insignifi-
cant effect on workers' contributions to the plans. The size variable, once
again, has a negative and significant effect on workers' contributions,just
as it did on the probability of participation in the 401 (k) offerings.
The estimates indicate that higher match rates produce significant
increases in workers' annual contribution rates. Having a match of be-
tween 50 and 75 percent raises the annual contribution rate by 0.8 per-
centage points compared to the contributions of workers in plans with a
25 percent match. Workers in plans with a 100 percent match have an-
nual contribution rates that are 2.0 percentage points higher than the
rate for participants in plans with only a 25 percent match. Figure 7 shows
the estimated contribution rates across the age spectrum under the three
alternative matching rates in the plans under study. The positive relation
between age and contribution rate mentioned earlier is clearly reflected
in the graph. Given the linear nature of the model, the effects of match
rates are constant across the age spectrum.
Figure 8 shows the estimated contribution rates across the wage spec-
trum at the three match levels used in the analysis. Workers' contribution
rates rise gradually until the annual wage level reaches $70,000 to $80,000
and then begin to decline. The decline at the higher wage levels is un-
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TAKI.E 10 Orrlinary Least Squares Estimation of 401 (k) Contribution Rates
l':,limalion wilh 17 companies r,!;limalion wilh 15 companies
Estimated Standardized Estimated Standardized
Variable coefficient t-value estimate coefficient t-value estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CONSTANT -33.60 -8.38 -33.76 -8.03
AGE 3.43 8.46 8.96 3.41 8.00 8.74
WAGE 0.72 23.99 0.49 0.96 28.92 0.64
AGP -12.38 -8.28 -27.36 -12.33 -7.83 -26.60
WAGP ~7.13 -19.51 ~ 1.09 -8.76 -22.68 -1.36
AGE' 19.46 8.15 28.71 19.36 7.70 27.80
WAGE' 18.85 15.08 1.48 22.46 17.23 1.81
AGE' -11.04 -7.93 -1O.n -10.95 -7.45 -9.73
WAGE' -13.97 -12.97 0.80 -16.38 -14.66 -0.96
REPRATE -0.00 -0.34 -0.00
MATCH2 0.61 8.62 0.07 0.79 9.19 0.09
MATCH3 1.55 24.60 0.20 2.00 26.68 0.26
SIZE -1.40 -33.93 ~0.19 -1.79 -38.82 -0.24
COMI 0.38 7.73 0.05 0.05 0.78 0.01
COM2 1.91 36.59 0.25 1.97 31.99 0.26
Valid cases 41,701 38,354
R-squared 0.14 0.15
Rbar-squared 0.14 0.15
F 508.98 480.80
SId error of estimate 3.41 3.44
Durbin-Watson 1.76 1.78
doubtedly related to the combined effects ofIRS maximum dollar limits
on pretax contributions to 401 (k) plans and to the limits imposed by the
ADP tests on these plans. At the upper wage levels reflected in the figure,
some workers would have reached the dollar limits with contributions of
7 percent of pay. Workers whose wage levels were above $65,000 in 1994
would have been in the highly compensated employee category and
would have been subject to the ADP limits imposed on plans. While the
figure suggests that the ADP tests appear not to have been a problem in
general, they likely result in limitations in individual plans.
Estimated con tribution rates to the plans by participan ts at various
wage levels under the four alternative levels ofcommunication are shown
in Figure 9. Introduction of specifically tailored plan information results
in a considerable increase in the annual contribution rale of two percent-
age points. The use of generic information does not alter annual contri-
butions of participants at all. Each of the lines in Figure 9 actually reflects
the outcomes under two different communications scenarios. The bot-
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Figure 7. Estimated employee contribution rates to 401 (k) plans by age of partici-
pant under alternative matching assumptions (COMI = 0, COM2 = 0, WAGE =
$35,000, SIZE =0, REPRATE =20%). Source: Authors' computations using Wat-
son Wyatt Worldwide data.
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Figure 8. Estimated employee contribution rates to 401 (k) plans by participant's
wage level under alternative matching assumptions (COMl = 0, COM2 =0, AGE =
40, SIZE = 0, REPRATE = 20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson
Wyatt Worldwide data.
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Figure 9. Estimated employee contribution rates to 401 (k) plans by participant's
wage level under alternative communications programs (MATCH = 25%, AGE =
40, REPRATE = 20%). Source: Authors' computations using Watson Wyatt World-
wide data.
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Figure 10. Estimated employee contribution rates to 401 (k) plans by participant's
wage level under alternative communications and matching programs (WAGE =
$35,000, SIZE = 0, REPRATE = 20%). Source: Authors' computations using Wat-
son Wyatt Worldwide data.
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tom line includes the case where only enrollment materials or enroll-
ment materials plus generic communications materials are distributed to
participants. The top line includes the cases where individually tailored
communications materials are distributed either with or without generic
communications.
Once again, it is clear that there is some tradeoff between higher
matching of employee contributions to 401 (k) plans and more intensive
communications of the programs as alternative means of improving the
participation in these plans. Figure 10 shows the estimated employee
contribution rates in these plans at various wage levels under three alter-
native scenarios. The bottom line in the figure reflects the estimate un-
der the scenario where the employer provides a 25 percent match of
employee contributions and provides no communications materials be-
yond the basic materials needed to enroll in the plan and move one's
money around. The top line in the figure represents the estimated par-
ticipation rates in the other two scenarios. One scenario would have the
sponsor increase the match rate in the plan from 25 percent to 100
percent. The other scenario would have the sponsor maintain the contri-
bution rate at 25 percent but implement a communications program that
was tailored to its own workforce and retirement plans. The outcome
under these two scenarios is identical for all practical purposes.
Conclusions
This analysis examines the factors affecting both participation and con-
tribution rates in 401 (k) plans using a limited cross-section ofcompanies.
Our results generally find that plan characteristics and communications
have a somewhat larger effect on both participation and contribution
levels than prior studies have indicated. The results of the current anal-
ysis suggest that further work should be done to expand the range of
plans to include a set of plans that provide no match on employee contri-
butions. Also the important effects of alternative communications pro-
grams on participation in these plans suggests that more detailed classi-
fication of the communications materials for future analyses would be
worthwhile. The data also suggest virtually no pension offset; that is,
401 (k) participation and contribution rates are only negligibly affected
by corporate defined benefit generosity.
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of WeiKe Hai and
Gordon Goodfellow of Watson Wyatt Worldwide for preparing the data
and developing the statistical analyses that are included in this chapter.
The opinions stated in this chapter are the authors', as is the respon-
sibility for any errors in the analyses.
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Notes
1. The Watson Wyatt data set is based on company employment records and
contains only those items routinely collected by employers. For this study, we were
able to determine the workers current age, their annual earnings for 1994, and
the expected value of future benefits from other pensions offered by the com-
pany. While other factors may be influence participation in a 401 (k) plan, these
variables represent some of the most important factors that workers consider
when deciding whether to make a 401 (k) contribution.
2. In developing the estimates, we dropped the two plans Q and R, where
matching was on the basis of participant dollar contributions to the plan.
3. The participation profiles discussed below illustrate how the estimated ef-
fects of alternative match rates and communications strategies vary with different
values of the other variables such as worker's age and annual wage.
4. For example, Papke (1993) reports an increase in plan participation rates of
17.4 percent associated with going from a zero match rate to a dollar-for-dollar
match.
5. The authors are currently investigating the potential interactive effects asso-
ciated with using both of these types of communications at the same time.
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